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Abstract—Malware is constantly adapting in order to avoid
detection. Model based malware detectors, such as SVM and
neural networks, are vulnerable to so-called adversarial examples
which are modest changes to detectable malware that allows
the resulting malware to evade detection. Continuous-valued
methods that are robust to adversarial examples of images have
been developed using saddle-point optimization formulations.
We are inspired by them to develop similar methods for the
discrete, e.g. binary, domain which characterizes the features
of malware. A specific extra challenge of malware is that the
adversarial examples must be generated in a way that preserves
their malicious functionality. We introduce methods capable of
generating functionally preserved adversarial malware examples
in the binary domain. Using the saddle-point formulation, we
incorporate the adversarial examples into the training of models
that are robust to them. We evaluate the effectiveness of the
methods and others in the literature on a set of Portable
Execution (PE) files. Comparison prompts our introduction of
an online measure computed during training to assess general
expectation of robustness.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Malware
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNN) started as extensions of neural
networks in artificial intelligence approaches to computer
vision and speech recognition. They are also used in computer
security applications such as malware detection. A large chal-
lenge in developing malware detection models is the intelligent
adversaries who actively try to evade them by judiciously
perturbing the detectable malware to create what are called
Adversarial Examples (AEs), i.e. malware variants that evade
detection.
Much of the work done to understand and counter AEs has
occurred in the image classification domain. An adversarial
attack on an image classifier perturbs an image so that it
is perceptually no different to a human but now classified
incorrectly by the classifier. To counter them, researchers have
demonstrated how DNN models can be trained more robustly.
These methods assume a continuous input domain [18].
Our interest is malware detection where, in contrast to im-
ages, detectors often use features represented as binary (0, 1)
inputs. Malware AEs must not only fool the detector, they must
also ensure that their perturbations do not alter the malicious
payload. Our preliminary goal is to develop a method that,
as is done in the continuous space, can generate (binary)
perturbations of correctly classified malware that evade the
detector. Our central goal is to investigate how the robust
adversarial training methods for continuous domains can be
transformed to serve the discrete or categorical feature do-
mains that include malware. We can measure the effectiveness
of a robust adversarial malware method on training a classifier
by the evasion rate of AEs and we also seek an online
training measure that expresses the general expectation of
model robustness.
This leads to the following contributions at the intersection
of security and adversarial machine learning: 1) We present
4 methods to generate binary-encoded AEs of malware with
preserved malicious functionality 2) We present the SLEIP-
NIR framework for training robust adversarial malware detec-
tors. SLEIPNIR employs saddle-point optimization (hence its
name1) to learn malware detection models for executable files
represented by binary-encoded features. 3) We demonstrate the
framework on a set of Portable Executables (PEs), observing
that incorporating randomization in the method is most effec-
tive. 4) We use the AEs of an adversarial crafting method [13]
that does not conform to the saddle-point formulation of
SLEIPNIR to evaluate the models from SLEIPNIR. We find that
the model of the randomized method is also robust to them.
5) Finally, we provide the SLEIPNIR framework and dataset
for public use.2
The paper is structured as follows. §.II presents background
and related work. §.III describes the method. Experiments are
in §.IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn and future work is
outlined in §.V.
II. BACKGROUND
Malware detection is moving away from hand-crafted
rule-based approaches and towards machine learning tech-
niques [25]. In this section we focus on malware detection
with neural networks (§.II-A), adversarial machine learning
(§.II-B) and adversarial malware versions (§.II-C).
A. Malware Detection using Neural Networks
Neural network methods for malware detection are increas-
ingly being used. For features, one study combines DNN’s
with random projections [9] and another with two dimensional
binary PE program features [24]. Research has also been
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleipnir
2https://github.com/ALFA-group/robust-adv-malware-detection.
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done on a variety of file types, such as Android and PE
files [5], [16], [22], [29]. While the specifics can vary greatly,
all machine learning approaches to malware detection share
the same central vulnerability to AEs.
B. Adversarial Machine Learning
Finding effective techniques that robustly handle AEs is one
focus of adversarial machine learning [6], [15]. An adversar-
ial example is created by making a small, essentially non-
detectable change to a data sample x to create xadv = x+ δ.
If the detector misclassifies xadv despite having correctly
classified x, then xadv is a successful adversarial example.
Goodfellow et al. [11] provide a clear explanation for the
existence of AEs.
There are a variety of techniques that generate AEs [11],
[26]. One efficient and widely used technique is the fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [11]. With respect to an input,
this method finds the directions that move the outputs of the
neural network the greatest degree and moves the inputs along
these directions by small amounts, or perturbations. Let x
represent an input, θ the parameters of the model, y the labels,
and L(θ,x, y) be the associated loss generated by the network.
Maintaining the restriction of -max perturbation, we can ob-
tain a max-norm output change using η = sgn(∇xL(θ,x, y)).
Because the technique references the detector’s parameters, it
is known as a white-box attack model [8], [11], [20].
There have been multiple studies focused on advancing
model performance against AEs, e.g. [19], [30]. One obvious
approach is retraining with the AEs incorporated into the
training set. We are attracted to the approach of [18]. It casts
model learning as a robust optimization problem with a saddle-
point formulation where the outer minimization of detector
(defensive) loss is tied to the inner maximization of detector
loss (via AEs) [18]. The approach successfully demonstrated
robustness against adversarial images by incorporating, while
training, AEs generated using projected gradient descent.
C. Adversarial Malware
Security researchers have generated malware AEs using an
array of machine learning approaches such as reinforcement
learning, genetic algorithms and supervised learning including
neural networks, decision trees and SVM [5], [10], [12]–[14],
[22], [24], [27], [28]. These approaches, with the exception
of [12], [13], are black box. They assume no knowledge of
the detector though the detector can be queried for detection
decisions. Multiple studies use binary features, typically where
each index acts as an indicator to express the presence or
absence of an API call, e.g. [23]. One study also includes
byte/entropy histogram features [24]. Studies to date have only
retrained with AEs.
Uniquely, this work generates functional white-box AEs in
the discrete, binary domain while incorporating them into the
training of a malware classifier that is robust to AEs.
III. METHOD
To address the problem of hardening machine learning anti-
malware detectors via adversarial learning, we formulate the
adversarial learning procedure as a saddle-point problem in
line with [18]. Before describing the problem formally and
presenting our proposed approach to tackle the same, we
introduce the notation and terminology used in the rest of the
paper.
A. Notation
This paper considers a malware classification task with an
underlying data distribution D over pairs of binary executable
representations and their corresponding labels (i.e., benign or
malignant). For brevity, we use malicious binary executable
and malware interchangeably. We denote the representation
space of the executables and their label space by X and Y ,
respectively. Based on extracted static features, each binary
executable is represented by a binary indicator vector x =
[x1, . . . , xm] ∈ X . That is, X = {0, 1}m and xj is a binary
value that indicates whether the jth feature is present or not.
On the other hand, labels are denoted by y ∈ Y = {0, 1},
where 0 and 1 denote benign and malignant executables,
respectively. We would like to learn the parameters θ ∈ Rp of a
binary classifier model such that it correctly classifies samples
drawn fromD. Typically, the model’s performance is measured
by a scalar loss function L(θ,x, y) (e.g., the cross entropy
loss). The task then is to find the optimal model parameters θ∗
that minimize the risk E(x,y)∼D[L(θ,x, y)]. Mathematically,
we have
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∈Rp
E(x,y)∼D[L(θ,x, y)] . (1)
B. Malware Adversarial Learning as a Saddle Point Problem
Blind spots are regions in a model’s decision space, on either
side of the decision boundary, where, because no training
example was provided, the decision boundary is inaccurate.
Blind spots of malware detection models—such as the one
learned in (1)—can be exploited to craft misclassified adver-
sarial malware samples from a correctly classified malware,
while still preserving malicious functionality. An adversarial
malware version xadv (which may or may not be misclassified)
of a correctly classified malware x can be generated by
perturbing x in a way that maximizes the loss L, i.e.,
xadv ∈ S∗(x) = arg max
x¯∈S(x)
L(θ, x¯, y) , (2)
where S(x) ⊆ X is the set of binary indicator vectors that
preserve the functionality of malware x, and S∗(x) ⊆ S(x)
is the set of adversarial malware versions that maximize the
adversarial loss.
To harden the model learned in (1) against the adversarial
versions generated in (2), one needs to incorporate them into
the learning process. We choose to do so by making use
of the saddle-point formulation presented in [18]. Thus, our
adversarial learning composes (1) and (2) as:
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∈Rp
E(x,y)∼D
[ adversarial loss︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
x¯∈S(x)
L(θ, x¯, y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adversarial learning
. (3)
Solving (3) involves an inner non-concave maximization prob-
lem and an outer non-convex minimization problem. Never-
theless, this formulation is particularly interesting because of
two reasons. First, in the case of a continuous differentiable
loss function (in the model parameters θ), Danskin’s theorem
states that gradients at inner maximizers correspond to descent
directions for the saddle-point problem—see [18] for a formal
proof. Second, it has been shown empirically that one can still
reliably optimize the saddle-point problem for learning tasks
with continuous feature space—i.e., X ⊆ Rm—even with i)
loss functions that are not continuously differentiable (e.g.,
ReLU units); and ii) using gradients at approximate maxi-
mizers of the inner problem [18]. To find these maximizers,
prior work has used variants of projected gradient descent
on the negative loss function such as the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [11] and its multi-step variant FGSMk [17].
Finding maximizers (or approximations) of the inner problem
for a given malware involves moving from continuous to
constrained binary optimization: flipping bits of the malware’s
binary feature vector x while preserving its functionality.
C. Adapting Gradient-Based Inner Maximization Methods for
Binary Feature Spaces
Our malware-suited methods step off from the empirical
success of gradient-based methods like FGSMk in approxi-
mating inner maximizers for continuous feature spaces [18].
The bulk of prior work has focused on adversarial attacks
against images. In such setups, pixel-level perturbations are
often constrained to `∞-ball around the image at hand [11].
In the case of malware, perturbations that preserve malicious
functionality correspond to setting unset bits in the binary
feature vector x of the malware at hand. As depicted in Fig. 1
(a), we can only add features that are not present in the
binary executable and never remove those otherwise. Thus,
S(x) = {x¯ ∈ {0, 1}m | x ∧ x¯ = x} and |S(x)| = 2m−xT 1.
One could incorporate all the adversarial malware versions in
the training through brute force enumeration but they grow
exponentially in number and blind spots could be redundantly
visited. On the other hand, with gradient-based methods, we
aim to introduce adversarial malware versions in an online
manner based on their difficulty in terms of model accuracy.
In the continuous space of images, projected gradient de-
scent can be used to incorporate the `∞-ball constraint (e.g.,
the Clip operator [17]). Inspired by linear programming
relaxation and rounding schemes for integer problems, we
extend the projection operator to make use of gradient-
based methods for the malware binary space via determin-
istic or randomized rounding giving rise to two discrete,
binary-encoded, constraint-based variants of FGSMk, namely
dFGSMk and rFGSMk, respectively. It is interesting to note
that MalGAN’s black-box system [14] used a deterministic
rounding scheme—with α = 0.5—to craft adversarial malware
versions.
With FGSMk in continuous space, AEs are generated by
moving iteratively in the feasible space (e.g., the `∞-ball
around around an image). In contrast, the crafted adversarial
malware versions are situated at the vertices of the binary
feature space. Instead of multi-stepping through the contin-
uous space to generate just one adversarial malware version
(i.e., dFGSMk or rFGSMk), we can use the gradient to visit
multiple feasible vertices (i.e., adversarial malware versions)
and choose the one with the maximum loss, see Fig. 1 (a).
This suggests a third method: multi-step Bit Gradient Ascent
(BGAk), see Fig. 1 (b). This method sets the bit of the jth
feature if the corresponding partial derivative of the loss is
greater than or equal to the loss gradient’s `2-norm divided
by
√
m. The rationale behind this is that the projection of a
unit vector with equal components onto any coordinate equals
1/
√
m. Therefore we set bits (features) whose corresponding
partial derivative contribute more or equally to the `2-norm of
the gradient in comparison to the rest of the features. After k
steps, the binary indicator vector that corresponds to the vertex
with the maximum loss among the visited vertices is chosen as
the adversarial malware version. A final method: multi-step
Bit Coordinate Ascent (BCAk) updates one bit in each step
by considering the feature with the maximum corresponding
partial derivative of the loss. A similar approach has been
shown effective for Android malware evasion in [12], [13].
Table I presents a formal definition of the methods. In the next
section, we propose a metric to measure their effectiveness in
covering the model’s blind spots.
D. Blind Spots Coverage
With adversarial learning, we aim to discover and address
blind spots of the model while learning its parameters simul-
taneously. In other words, we would like to incorporate as
many members of S∗(x) as possible in training the model.
In line with this notion, we propose a new measure called the
blind spots covering number, denoted NBS , which measures
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Fig. 1. (a) Two malicious binary executables (malwares) in the 3-dimensional
binary indicator vector space. The set of adversarial malware versions for the
malware at [1, 0, 0] is S([1, 0, 0]) = {[1, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 1]},
and for the malware at [0, 1, 1] is S([0, 1, 1]) = {[0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 1]}. The
arrows point to the set of allowed perturbations. (b) Two-step bit gradient
ascent (BGA2). The solid arrows represent the loss gradient at the arrows
end points, while the dashed arrows represent the bit gradient ascent update
step. At step 1, the contribution to the magnitude of the loss gradient
(`2-norm) is predominantly towards setting the 3rd feature. Thus, x1 is
obtained by setting x0’s 3rd bit. Similarly, x2 is obtained by setting x1’s
2nd bit. After visiting 2 vertices besides our starting vertex, we choose
arg maxx∈{x0,x1,x2} L(θ,x, 1) as the adversarial malware version of x0.
Note that this a special case of BGAk , where only one bit is set at a step.
Two-step bit coordinate ascent (BCA2) would generate the same adversarial
malware version.
TABLE I
Proposed inner maximizers for the saddle-point problem (3).
Considered inner maximization methods for crafting adversarial versions of a malware given its binary indicator vector x. Denote ∂L(θ,xt, y)/∂xtj by ∂xtjL, the
adversarial malware version by x¯k , the projection operator into the interval [a, b] by Π[a,b] such that Π[a,b] = max(min(x, b), a), the OR operator by ∨, and the XOR
operator by ⊕. Furthermore, for all the methods, the initial starting point x0 can be any point from S(x), i.e., x0 ∈ S(x). In our setup, x0 is set to x. For BGAk and
BCAk , the (1− 2xtj) term is used to enforce that the gradient is towards 0 if xtj = 1, and vice versa.
Method Definition
FGSMk with deterministic rounding (dFGSMk)
xt+1j = Π[0,1]
(
xtj + sgn(∂xtj
L)
)
, 0 ≤ j < m , 0 ≤ t < k
x¯kj = 1
{
xkj > α
}
∨ xj , α ∈ [0, 1] , 0 ≤ j < m
xadv ∈ arg max{L(θ,x∗, 1) | x∗ ∈ {x¯k,x}}
FGSMk with randomized rounding (rFGSMk)
xt+1j = Π[0,1]
(
xtj + sgn(∂xtj
L)
)
, 0 ≤ j < m , 0 ≤ t < k
x¯kj = 1
{
xkj > αj
}
∨ xj , αj ∈ U(0, 1) , 0 ≤ j < m
xadv ∈ arg max{L(θ,x∗, 1) | x∗ ∈ {x¯k,x}}
Multi-Step Bit Gradient Ascent (BGAk)
xt+1j =
(
xtj ⊕ 1
{
(1− 2xtj) ∂xtjL ≥
1√
m
||∇xL(θ,xt, y)||2
})
∨ xj , 0 ≤ j < m , 0 ≤ t < k
xadv ∈ arg max{L(θ,x∗, 1) | x∗ ∈ {xt}0≤t≤k ∪ {x}}
Multi-Step Bit Coordinate Ascent (BCAk)
jt+1 ∈ arg max1≤j≤m(1− 2xtj) ∂xtjL
xt+1j = (x
t
j ⊕ 1{j = jt+1}) ∨ xj , 0 ≤ j < m , 0 ≤ t < k
xadv ∈ arg max{L(θ,x∗, 1) | x∗ ∈ {xt}0≤t≤k ∪ {x}}
the effectiveness of an algorithm A in computing the inner
maximizers of (3). The measure is defined as the expected
ratio of the number of adversarial malware versions crafted
by A during training, denoted by S∗A(x), to the maximum
possible number of the same. Formally, it can be written as
follows.
NBS(A) = E(x,y)∼D
[
y|S∗A(x)|
2m−xT 1
]
(4)
Models trained with high NBS have seen more AEs in
training, and because training against multiple AEs implies
more exhaustive approximations of the inner maximization
problem, they are expected to be more robust against adversar-
ial attacks [18]. While it may be computationally expensive to
compute (4) exactly, we provide a probabilistic approximation
of it in §.IV-B.
E. Adversarial Learning Framework
Having specified four methods for approximating the inner
maximizers of (3) and a measure of their effectiveness, we can
now describe SLEIPNIR, our adversarial learning framework
for robust malware detection. Consider a training dataset D
of n independent and identically distributed samples drawn
from D. As outlined in Algorithm 1 and depicted in Fig. 2,
SLEIPNIR groups D into minibatches B of s examples similar
to [17]. However, the grouping here is governed by the
examples’ labels: the first r < s examples are malicious,
followed by s − r benign examples. At each training step,
the model’s parameters θ are optimized with respect to the
adversarial loss (2) of malware executables and the natural
loss (1) of benign executables. This is motivated by the
fact that authors of benign applications have no interest in
having their binaries misclassified as malwares [12]. However,
one should note that a malware author might wish to create
adversarial benign applications to poison the training dataset.
This possibility is considered for future work. As an equation,
our empirical saddle-point problem at each training step has
the form
min
θ∈Rp
1
s
[ r∑
i=1
max
x¯(i)∈S(x(i))
L(θ, x¯(i), 1) +
s∑
i=r+1
L(θ,x(i), 0)
]
.
(5)
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section provides an empirical evaluation of our propo-
sition in §.III. We conduct experiments to validate and com-
pare the efficacy of the proposed methods in terms of classifi-
cation accuracy, evasion rates, and blind spots coverage. First,
the setup of our experiments is described in §.IV-A, followed
by a presentation of the results in §.IV-B.
A. Setup
Dataset. The Portable Executable (PE) format [2] is a file
format for executables in Windows operating systems. The
format encapsulates information necessary for Windows OS
to manage the wrapped code. PE files have widespread use as
malware. We created a corpus of malicious and benign PE files
from VirusShare [3] and internet download sites, respectively.
Algorithm 1 SLEIPNIR
Input:
N : neural network model, D : training dataset,
s : minibatch size, r : number of malwares in minibatch,
A : inner maximizer algorithm (any of Table I)
1: Randomly initialize network N
2: repeat
3: Read minibatch B from dataset D
B = {x(1), . . . ,x(s) | yi≤r = 1, yi>r = 0}
4: Generate r adversarial versions {x(1)adv, . . . ,x(r)adv}
from feasible sets of corresponding malware examples
{S(x(1)), . . . ,S(x(r))} by A using current state of N
5: Make new minibatch
B′ = {x(1)adv, . . . ,x(r)adv,x(r+1), . . . ,x(s)}
6: Do one training step of network N with minibatch B′
7: until training converged
Malignant
PEs
(malwares)
Benign
PEs
Inner  
Maximization
(any of Table I 
methods)
Neural Net (N)
...
...
Outer  
Minimization
(any of gradient 
descent methods)
...
Fig. 2. Overview of the SLEIPNIR framework. Malware is perturbed by an
inner maximization method (any of Table I) to create AEs. The generated
adversarial malware versions and benign examples are used in an outer
minimization of the adversarial and natural loss (5), which can be solved
in minibatches using any variant of the gradient descent algorithm.
To label the collected PEs, we use VirusTotal’s [4] ensemble
of virus detectors. We require benign files to have 0% positive
detections from the ensemble and malicious files to have
greater than 50% positive detections to avoid false positives.
At the time of writing this paper, we have 34,995 malicious
and 19,696 benign PEs.
Feature Representation. As mentioned earlier, each
portable executable is represented as a binary indicator feature
vector. Each index of the feature vector represents a unique
Windows API call and a ”1” in a location represents the
presence of the corresponding API call. In our dataset of PEs,
we found a total of 22,761 unique API calls. Thus, each PE
file is represented by a binary indicator vector x ∈ {0, 1}m,
with m = 22, 761. We use the LIEF [1] library to parse each
PE and turn it into its representative binary feature vector.3
Neural Net (N ) Architecture. We use a feed-forward
network for our malware classifier N with 3 hidden layers
of 300 neurons each. The ReLU activation function is applied
to all the 3× 300 hidden neurons. The LogSoftMax function
is applied to the output layer’s two neurons which correspond
to the two labels at hand: benign and malicious. The model is
implemented in PyTorch [21].
Learning Setup. We use 19, 000 benign PEs and 19, 000
malicious PEs to construct our training (60%), validation
(20%), and test (20%) sets. The training set is grouped
into minibatches of 16 PE samples according to Line 3 of
Algorithm 1. The classifier N ’s parameters θ are tuned with
respect to (5), where L is the negative log likelihood loss, using
the ADAM optimization algorithm with a 0.001 learning rate
over 150 epochs. Note that one step of ADAM corresponds to
Line 6 of Algorithm 1. To avoid overfitting, model parameters
at the minimum validation loss are used as the final learned
parameters θ∗. With regard to the inner maximizers algorithms
(Table I), all were set to perform 50 steps, i.e., k = 50. This
makes the step size  for dFGSMk and rFGSMk small enough
(we set it to  = 0.02) to follow the gradient accurately
while also ensuring that multi-steps could reach close to
other vertices of the binary feature space (Fig. 1) and not be
suppressed by rounding. With 50 steps and 0.02 step size, both
these conditions are met. We run Algorithm 1 with A being
set to each of the inner maximizers from Table I to obtain 4
adversarially trained models in addition to the model trained
naturally. We also used the adversarial sample crafting method
presented by Grosse et al. [13, Algorithm 1] which trains a
model adversarially without using a saddle-point formulation:
the AEs in [13] are tuned with respect to the value of the
benign output neuron rather than the loss L. Though not
directly, this does maximize the adversarial loss value. All
experiments for the six models were run on a CUDA-enabled
GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
B. Results
For brevity, we refer to the trained models by their inner
maximizer methods. Experiment results are presented in Ta-
bles II and III as follows.
Classification Performance. Based on Table II, all the
adversarially trained models achieve a classification accuracy
comparable to the naturally trained counterpart. However, we
observe that models trained using inner maximizers of Table I
tend to have higher false positive rate (FPR) and lower false
negative rate (FNR)—positive denotes malicious. The FPR
increase can be explained by the transforming of malware
samples when models are trained adversarially. Such trans-
formations could turn malware feature vectors into ones more
similar to those of the benign population, and subsequently the
benign test set. Likewise, the FNR decrease can be attributed
to the adversarial versions boosting the model’s confidence
on vertices with less original malicious samples compared to
3The generated feature vectors are available by request.
the benign samples. With [13]’s method, it is the other way
around. Arguably, the reason is that its adversarial objective is
to maximize just the benign (negative) neuron’s output and it is
indifferent to the malicious (positive) neuron. As a result, the
crafted adversarial malware version does not necessarily end
up at a vertex at which the model’s confidence, with respect
to the malicious label, is low, which consequently improves
the FPR and worsens the FNR.
Robustness to Evasion Attacks. We tried the adversarial
attackers generated by the inner maximizers and [13]’s method
as inputs to each of the trained models to assess their robust-
ness against the adversaries generated during training as well
as other adversaries. It can be seen in Table III that rFGSMk is
our most successful adversarial training method, achieving
relatively low evasion rates across all attack methods. As
expected, all training methods are resistant to attacks using
the same method, but each method aside from rFGSMk has at
least one adversarial method that it performs poorly against.
Evasion rates for Natural training, which uses non-altered
malicious samples, provide a baseline for comparison.
Blind Spots Coverage. Given the high-dimension fea-
ture vectors and the sizeable dataset, it was computationally
expensive to compute NBS exactly. Instead, we computed
an approximate probabilistic measure N¯BS using a Bloom
filter [7]. The computed measures are presented in the last
column of Table II as the ratio of total adversarial malware
versions to original samples over all the training epochs.
Natural training has a ratio of 1.0 since we do not modify
the malicious samples in any way. A coverage value of 4.0
for rFGSMk means that with high probability we explored
4 times as many malicious samples compared to Natural
training. A high coverage value indicates that the adversarial
training explored more of the valid region S(x) for malware
sample x, resulting in a more robust model. This observation
is substantiated by the correlation between coverage values
in Table II and evasion rates in Table III. Note that N¯BS
is computed and updated after each training step. Thus, it
can be used as an online measure to assess training methods’
robustness to adversarial attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We investigated methods that reduce the adversarial blind
spots for neural network malware detectors. We approached
this as a saddle-point optimization problem in the binary
domain and used this to train DNNs via multiple inner
maximization methods that are robust to adversarial malware
versions of the dataset.
We used a dataset of PE files to assess the robustness against
evasion attacks. Our experiments have demonstrated once
again the power of randomization in addressing challenging
problems, conforming to the conclusions provided by state-
of-art attack papers [8]. Equipping projected gradient descent
with randomness in rounding helped uncover roughly 4 times
as many malicious samples in the binary feature space as those
uncovered in natural training. This performance correlated
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE METRICS OF THE TRAINED MODELS.
In percentage, Accuracy, False Positive Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate (FNR)
are of the test set: 3800 malicious PEs and 3800 bengin PEs, with k = 50. N¯BS
denotes the probabilistic normalized measure computed during training to approximate
the blind spots covering number NBS . This was obtained using a Bloom filter to track
the number of distinct malware samples presented during training, be they from the
original malware training samples or their adversarial versions. Models corresponding
to bold cells are the best with regard to the corresponding measure/rate. The measures of
the inner maximizers and [13]’s are reported in their relative difference to Natural’s
counterparts.
Model Accuracy FPR FNR N¯BS
Natural 91.9 8.2 8.1 1.0
dFGSMk +0.1 +1.4 −1.7 +1.6
rFGSMk −0.6 +3.6 −2.4 +3.0
BGAk +0.2 +0.0 −0.5 +2.5
BCAk −0.3 +0.9 −0.5 +0.0
[13]’s method −1.1 −3.9 +5.9 +0.6
TABLE III
EVASION RATES.
Evasion rates of adversaries on the test set against the trained models with k = 50.
Models corresponding to bold cells are the most robust models with regard to the
corresponding adversary. Adversaries corresponding to shaded cells are the (or one of
the) most successful adversaries with regard to the corresponding model. Evasion rates of
the proposed inner maximizers are the lowest on their corresponding expected adversary
after the Natural adversary as shown by the corresponding framed cells along the
diagonal. This conforms to their saddle-point formulation, in contrast to [13]’s method
with BCAk being its weakest adversary after the Nautral adversary, as framed below.
This is expected as training with [13]’s method does not follow an exact saddle-point
formulation.
Model
Adversary
Natural dFGSMk rFGSMk BGAk BCAk [13]’s method
Natural 8.1 99.7 99.7 99.7 41.7 99.7
dFGSMk 6.4 6.4 21.1 7.3 27.4 99.2
rFGSMk 5.7 7.0 5.9 5.9 6.8 35.0
BGAk 7.6 39.6 17.8 7.6 10.9 68.4
BCAk 7.6 99.5 99.5 91.8 7.9 98.6
[13] ’s method 14.0 69.3 69.3 37.5 14.1 15.6
with the online measure we introduced to assess the general
expectation of robustness.
There are several future research questions. First, we would
like to study the loss landscape of the adversarial malware
versions and the effect of starting point x0 initialization for
inner maximizers, in comparison to their continuous-domain
counterparts. Second, NBS quantifies how many different
adversarial examples are generated but it does not capture
how they are located with regard to the benign examples and,
subsequently, their effect on the model’s FPR and FNR. We
hope that investigating these directions will lead towards fully
resistant deep learning models for malware detection.
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